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THE SELF-INFLICTED HARDSHIP RULE IN
PENNSYLVANIA VARIANCE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of several Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the issue of self-inflicted hardship in variance applications,
confusion has developed over the status of that doctrine in Pennsylvania.'
The subsequent interpretations of these decisions by the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court have done little to reconcile these cases and estab-
lish a clear self-inflicted hardship rule in the state.
2
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the supreme court cases
in order to determine if this confusion can be eliminated by reconciling
these decisions, thereby creating a unified, concise rule.3 In addition,
the commonwealth court's interpretations of these decisions will be
examined in order to determine if the lower court has been faithful to
supreme court precedent, and whether the commonwealth court's deci-
sions are consistent with each other.4 Finally, this comment will ex-
amine the supreme court's decisions to determine if they indeed effectu-
ate the policy underlying the variance provisions,5 and suggest a rule
which would better achieve this policy.6
II. VARIANCE LAW
A variance has been defined as the authority for the construction
or maintenance of a building or structure, or the establishment or
maintenance of a use of land which is prohibited by the zoning or-
dinance.7 The basic policy underlying the variance statute is the cor-
1. For a discussion of the various theories of the self-inflicted hardship
rule in Pennsylvania, see notes 35-71 and accompanying text infra.
2. For an analysis of Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpretations
of the self-inflicted hardship rule, see notes 115-84 and accompanying text infra.
3. For a discussion of the possible reconciliation of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court decisions, see notes 86-106 and accompanying text infra.
4. For an analysis of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decisions,
see notes 170-84 and accompanying text infra.
5. For an analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of the
policies underlying the variance provisions, see notes 187-90 and accompanying
text infra.
6. For a discussion of the suggested rule, see notes 91-106 and accompanying
text infra.
7. R. ANDERSON, AMERIcAN LAW OF ZONING, § 14.02 (1968). Another
writer has defined a variance as an "authorization for a property owner to
(156)
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rection of inequities created by the operation of the general zoning
ordinance.8 By providing an "escape hatch" or "safety valve" from the
literal terms of the ordinance, a variance prevents challenges that the
statute is unconstitutionally confiscatory by property owners denied the
beneficial use of their land.9
The utility of the variance procedure as a "safety valve" was rec-
ognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in National Land & In-
vestment Co. v. Kohn.10 The supreme court stated that "the variance
depart from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance as it applies to his
land." 6 J. ROHAN, ZONING 8 LAND USE CONTROLS, § 43.01[2] at 43-3 (1981).
There are two specific types of variances. The use variance allows the
landowner to use existing property in a manner not permitted by the or-
dinance. Id. at 43-4. See also 2 ANDERSON, at J§ 14.06, 14.08-14.15. On the
other hand, the area variance allows deviations from restrictions on construc-
tion and placement of buildings and other structures. 6 ROHAN, §43.011]
at 43-4. See also 2 ANDERSON, at § 14.07. The effect of this distinction is
to require a stricter showing of need for a use variance than for an area
variance, primarily because the use variance has a greater impact on the
surrounding area and its residents. Brennan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments,
409 Pa. 376, 187 A.2d 180 (1963).
The standard of proof necessary for variances generally is to prove that
the effect of the ordinance burdens the property with an unnecessary hardship
that is unique to the particular property, and that the variance would not
have an adverse effect on the public health, safety, or welfare. Sposato v.
Radnor Township Bd. of Adjustment, 440 Pa. 107, 270 A.2d 616 (1970);
Appeal of Bilotta, 440 Pa. 105, 270 A.2d 619 (1970); Appeal of Patti, 440
Pa. 101, 270 A.2d 400 (1970); Pyzdrowski v. Bd. of Adjustment, 437 Pa. 481,
263 A.2d 426 (1970).
For a general discussion of variances, see Green, The Power of the Zoning
Board of Adjusters to Gran't Variances from the Zoning Ordinances, 29 N.C.L.
REv. 254 (1951); Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1396 (1961); Note,
Zoning Variances: The "Unnecessary Hardship" Rule, 8 SmAcusE L. REV.
85 (1956).
8. 2 ANDERSON, supra note 7, at § 14.02. Additional policies supporting
the granting of variances are to prevent undue interference with private prop-
erty through the zoning restrictions, and to insure that property capable of
practical use will not remain unused. 6 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[4][a]
at 43-13 to 43-14.
9. 2 ANDERSON, supra note 7, at § 14.02. The "taking clause" of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. Because zoning ordinances do not generally
provide notice or a hearing for landowners whose property is affected, the
challenge is that the property is "taken", i.e., restricted in its use, without due
process. Thus, by allowing variances to be granted in certain individual
cases when specific criteria are met, repeated challenges to the constitution-
ality of the zoning ordinance are prevented.
One writer has described the practical effects of a variance by stating:
The variance . . . affords more immediate and less complicated re-
lief to individual owners who suffer hardships caused by the enforce-
ment of local land use laws. Moreover, it may be less costly and
far more feasible to secure a variance than to obtain a judicial de-
termination that the ordinance is invalid or unconstitutional.
6 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[2] at 43-4.
10. 419 Pa. 504, 512, 215 A.2d 597, 602 (1965). See also Forest Hills
Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 392, 187 A.2d 166 (1963); Colligan Zoning Case,
401 Pa. 125, 162 A.2d 652 (1960).
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provision of the enabling act functions as an 'escape valve' so that when
regulations which apply to all are unnecessarily burdensome to a few
because of certain unique circumstances, a means of relief from the
mandates of the ordinance is provided." "1 Therefore, the proper appli-
cation of the variance procedure is to insure that the land can be put
to a practical use, rather than having the land remain unused.
12
Variances also promote the important policy against "spot zon-
ing." Is Spot zoning is the zoning of a specific property which is not
in conformity with the classification applicable to the surrounding
property.'4 An administrative dispensation from such an undue re-
striction by means of a variance is preferable to the legislative action of
rezoning, which in effect weakens the uniformity and effectiveness of
the zoning ordinance.'5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has developed certain principles
which govern the disposition of variance cases. 1 These principles were
most concisely enunciated in O'Neill v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,'
7
where the court stated:
In considering the merits of this appeal, we bear in mind
the following principles which govern the disposition of vari-
ance cases: ... variances should be granted only sparingly and
only under exceptional circumstances, . . . in order to obtain a
variance, the petitioner must prove (1) that the variance will
not be contrary to the public interest and (2) that unnecessary
hardship will result if the variance is not granted; ...a vari-
ance will not be granted solely because the petitioner will
suffer an economic hardship if he does not receive one.' 8
In addition to the principles enunciated in O'Neill, the supreme court
has stated:
11. 419 Pa. at 512, 215 A.2d at 602.
12. 6 ROHAN, supra note 7, § 43-01[4][a] at 43-13. For a discussion of
the economic justifications of zoning variance provisions, see Green, supra
note 7.
13. 6 RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43-01[4][a] at 43-13.
14. Id. at 43-14.
15. Id. See also Comment, General Welfare, Welfare Economics, and
Zoning Variances, 38 So. CAL. L. Rav. 548 (1965).
16. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text infra.
17. 434 Pa. 331, 254 A.2d 12 (1969).
18. Id. at 334-35, 254 A.2d at 14. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed the granting of a variance that would have permitted the appellee to
erect an apartment building with an amount of floor space in excess of zoning
regulations. Id. at 333, 254 A.2d at 14. Because economic hardship was the
only justification for the variance offered by the appellee, the court disallowed
the variance. Id. at 335, 254 A.2d at 15. The court noted that the appellee
failed to prove two other elements necessary to secure a variance: first, that
the property cannot be utilized in its present state; and second, that it could
not profitably be used for another purpose consistent with the ordinance. Id.
[VOL. 27: p. 156
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The sole justification for the grant of a variance is that a strict
application of the terms of the zoning statute will result in an
"unnecessary hardship," and even then, the variance can be
granted only if "the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed,
the public health, safety, and general welfare secured and sub-
stantial justice done." 19
It is apparent that even though a variance is intended as a "safety
valve" in order to protect the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance,
'20
they are not to be granted freely. It would be a fallacy to assume that
"every lot is guaranteed the right to be used at maximum residential
density regardless of its size." 21 In order to get a variance under the
principles set forth in O'Neill, a petitioner has a substantial burden,
and a variance is given only if it maintains the public health, safety,
and welfare.2
2
When the variance provisions of the Municipalities Planning Code
were enacted in 1968, it was the intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature
to merely codify the law which had developed in regard to the granting
of a variance.23 Section 10912 of the Municipalities Planning Code
provides:
The board shall hear requests for variances where it is
alleged that the provisions of the zoning ordinance inflict
unnecessary hardship upon the applicant .... The board may
grant a variance provided the following findings are made
where relevant in a given case:
(1) That there are unique physical circumstances or con-
ditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of
lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other phy-
sical conditions peculiar to the particular property, and that
the unnecessary hardship is due to such conditions, and not
the circumstances or conditions generally created by the provi-
19. Richman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 259-60, 137 A.2d
280, 283 (1958), quoting Jury's Appeal (No. 1), 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 543, 546 (1926).
In discussing the key requirement of "unnecessary hardship", the court noted
that such an analysis turns on the circumstances of each case. 391 Pa. at
260, 137 A.2d at 284. It emphasized, however, that the hardship must be un-
necessary and unique to the property involved, not to the entire district, and
that an increase or decrease in property value is by itself insufficient to con-
stitute grounds for a variance. Id.
20. For a discussion of the policies regarding the constitutionality of the
zoning ordinance, see notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra.
21. Christner v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 87, 94, 397 A.2d
30, 32 (1979).
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
23. See Sisko v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 556, 559,
389 A.2d 231, 233 (1978); Campbell v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 10 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 251, 255, 310 A.2d 444, 446 (1973).
1981-82]
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sions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district
in which the property is located;
(2) That because of such physical circumstances or condi-
tions, there is no possibility that the property can be developed
in strict conformity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance
and that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary
to enable the reasonable use of the property;
(3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created
by the appellant;
(4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the
essential character of the neighborhood, or district in which
the property is located, nor substantially or permanently im-
pair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property,
nor be detrimental to the public welfare; and
(5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the
minimum variance that will afford relief and will represent
the least modification possible of the regulation in issue.
In granting any variance, the board may attach such rea-
sonable conditions and safeguards as it may deem necessary
to implement the purposes of this act and zoning ordinance.
24
Such strong requirements are indicative of a policy favoring the provi-
sions of the zoning ordinance, and the granting of variances only in
extraordinary situations.
The portion of the variance statute under consideration in this
comment is section 10912(3), which provides "that such unnecessary
hardship has not been created by the appellant." 25 It is this section
of the statute which is designed to prevent the granting of a variance
to one who has created his own hardship, and alleges this hardship as
the sole basis for his variance application.
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Conceptually, the supreme court cases dealing with the issue of
self-inflicted hardship in variance applications can be grouped into
three principal categories. The first of these categories is represented
by McClure Appeal,2 which held that no variance could be granted
if the purchaser had knowledge of the zoning restriction when the
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (Purdon 1972). Section 10601 of the
Municipalities Planning Code delegates to the governing body of each munici-
pality the power to "enact, amend and repeal zoning ordinances." Id. § 10601.
The purpose of such an enabling statute is "to protect and promote safety,
health and morals [and] to provide for the general welfare." Id. § 10105.
25. Id. § 10912(3).
26. 415 Pa. 285, 203 A.2d 534 (1964).
[VOL. 27: p. 156
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property was purchased. 27 A second approach is that stated in Appeal
of Gro 28 where the supreme court focuses on the purchase price paid
for the property in question. 29 The third approach is represented by
Poster Advertising Company v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 30 in which
the supreme court concentrated on the denial to the owner of any pro-
ductive use of the land.31 A possible fourth category is represented by
the case of Upper Leacock Township Supervisors v. Zoning Hearing
Board.3 - It is suggested that this case may be placed in its own category,
not because it presents a new approach, but because it is the latest case
decided by the supreme court dealing with self-inflicted hardship, and
therefore may indicate the direction which the court is taking with
respect to reconciling the above cases.83
A. Knowledge of Restriction at the Time of Purchase
In McClure Appeal,M the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company
applied for a permit to erect a branch bank on land zoned as residen-
tial.3 5 After the permit was denied,30 Fidelity successfully applied for
a variance under the zoning ordinance. 87 In reversing the granting of
the variance, 3 the McClure court focused on the fact that when Fidelity
purchased the property, it knew that the area was zoned residential,
27. Id. at 291, 203 A.2d at 537. For an analysis of the McClure decision,
see notes 34-40 and accompanying text infra.
28. 440 Pa. 552, 269 A.2d 876 (1970).
29. Id. at 560, 269 A.2d at 880-81. For a discussion of the Gro decision,
see notes 44-60 and accompanying text infra.
30. 408 Pa. 248, 182 A.2d 521 (1962).
31. Id. at 252, 182 A.2d at 524. For a discussion of the Poster decision,
see notes 61-68 and accompanying text infra.
32. 481 Pa. 479, 393 A.2d 5 (1978).
33. For a discussion of the Upper Leacock decision, see notes 72-85 and
accompanying text infra.
34. 415 Pa. 285, 203 A.2d 534 (1964).
35. Id. at 286, 203 A.2d at 535.
36. Id. The permit was denied because "1) a business building was not
a permitted use, 2) the proposed building would violate front and side yard
setback provisions of the zoning ordinance, and 3) the proposed signs were
not permitted under the ordinance and, as proposed, violated the front yard
setback provisions." Id. at n.2.
37. Id. at 287, 203 A.2d at 535. The Board granted the variance, deter-
mining that the branch would be in the public interest. Id. at 290, 203 A.2d
at 537.
38. Id. at 292, 203 A.2d at 538. The scope of review on appeal is to deter-
mine whether the Board committed an abuse of discretion, or an error of
law. Brennan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 376, 187 A.2d 180 (1963);
Crafton Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 82, 185 A.2d 533 (1962). The court noted
that the Board's power to grant a variance "is to be sparingly exercised and
only under peculiar and exceptional circumstances." 415 Pa. at 287, 20'1
A.2d at 535, citing Sglarlat v. Board of Adjustment, 407 Pa. 324, 180 A.2d
769 (1962); Cresko Zoning Case, 400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960).
1981-82]
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and despite such knowledge, still purchased the lot.3 9 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that Fidelity was in no position to claim an unneces-
sary hardship, stating: "[O]ne who seeks a variance cannot be heard to
complain of a hardship involved when the same condition was present
to his knowledge when he purchased the property." 40
The holding in McClure was subsequently relied on by the O'Neill
court in 1969,4 1 where the court emphasized that "[e]specially is a vari-
ance not to be granted when the petitioners purchased the property
with the knowledge of the existing zoning regulations or when he
should have been aware of the zoning regulation." 42 The following
year, three cases were decided by the supreme court that reaffirmed the
knowledge rationale.
48
39. 415 Pa. at 291, 203 A.2d at 537. The court assumed that the land
could not be used practically for residential purposes. Id. However, because
Fidelity purchased the land "despite such knowledge and with its eyes open,"
the court held that it was estopped to claim unnecessary hardship. Id.
40. Id. at 288, 203 A.2d at 536, citing Cresko Zoning Case, 400 Pa. 467,
162 A.2d 219 (1960); Upper St. Clair Township Grange Zoning Case, 397
Pa. 67, 152 A.2d 768 (1959). The court stated further:
[w]here the hardship is, as here, self-inflicted, it is not the function
of the court to grant redress in the form of a variance. The [appli-
cant for a variance] cannot now be heard to complain of the economic
hardship involved as the same conditions were present when (he]
purchased the property.
415 Pa. at 291-92, 203 A.2d at 537-38. The court had an extensive back-
ground of precedent to support its decision. See Hasage v. Philadelphia
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 415 Pa. 31, 202 A.2d 61 (1964); Dishler v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 244, 199 A.2d 418 (1964); Cooper v. Bd. of Ad-
justment, 412 Pa. 429, 195 A.2d 101 (1963); Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963); Di Santo v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
410 Pa. 331, 189 A.2d 135 (1963); MacLean v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409
Pa. 82, 185 A.2d 533 (1962).
41. 434 Pa. at 335, 254 A.2d at 14. For a discussion of another portion of
the O'Neill opinion, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
42. 434 Pa. at 335, 254 A.2d at 14.
43. See Appeal of Patti, 440 Pa. 101, 104, 270 A.2d 400, 402 (1970) ("a
purchaser who knew or should have known how his property was zoned cannot
subsequently rely upon the economic hardship allegedly caused [by the zoning]
in order to obtain a variance"); Bilotta v. Haverford Township Zoning Bd.,
440 Pa. 105, 107, 270 A.2d 619, 620 (1970) (economic hardship alone will not
justify a variance, particularly when the purchaser knew of the restricting zoning
regulation at the time of acquisition); Sposato v. Radnor Township Bd., 440
Pa. 107, 112, 270 A.2d 616, 618 (1970) (error to grant variance to one who agreed
to purchase the land, knowing that his proposed use was impermissible without
rezoning).
A sub-category to the McClure line of cases appears in Volpe Appeal, 384
Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956). In Volpe Appeal, two lots were purchased in
1944 or 1945 totaling approximately 32,000 square feet. Id. at 375, 121 A.2d
at 98. The property was zoned in 1929 as "AA" residential, and the zoning
ordinance was amended in 1941 to require that a lot be at least 20,000 square
feet in order to permit a building to be erected on the property. Id. In
1949, after building a dwelling on this tract, the owner conveyed a portion of
the tract. id. The area of the lot conveyed was 20,130 square feet. Id.
Therefore, the lot retained by the owner was only 12,448 square feet, and
[VOL. 27: p. 156
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B. Payment of an Inflated Purchase Price in
Anticipation of a Variance
On the same day that the three decisions affirming the knowledge
rule were handed down,44 Appeal of Gro 45 was decided by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. Gro was an appeal from a lower court deci-
sion granting a variance permitting construction of fifty-nine apart-
ment units. 46  The topography of the lot was such that extensive grad-
ing and other improvements would be required to prepare the site
either for single family residential or apartment development.47 Based
on expert testimony, the lower court found that if six single family
dwellings were constructed on the property, the price of these dwellings
would be approximately $70,000, and that no market for single family
homes in this price range existed in this immediate area.48 The lower
court concluded, therefore, that this was a unique and unnecessary hard-
ship justifying the grant of a variance.
49
The supreme court began its analysis by stating that although eco-
nomic hardship alone is an insufficient reason to grant a variance, this
doctrine had only been applied where the economic "hardship" was a
denial of the most profitable choice.50 The Gro court noted that the
-evidence here demonstrated an inability for any profitable use in accord-
ance with the zoning regulation. 51 Although the lack of any profitable
-use for property had been used in other cases as a factor in favor of a
the owner desired to construct a dwelling on this remaining tract, Id. The
owner had been engaged in the building business for twenty-six years and
had actual knowledge of the zoning regulations. Id. at 376, 121 A.2d at 98.
'The owner applied for a variance to construct a dwelling on the under-sized
lot, and the variance was denied. Id. at 375-76, 121 A.2d at 98. The supreme
court, in affirming the denial of the variance, held that the owner himself
-created the hardship by conveying part of his tract, and leaving himself with
a lot which did not meet the criteria of the zoning regulation. Id. at 378, 121
A.2d at 100. Because the owner did this with full knowledge of the applicable
zoning restrictions, his hardship was found to be self-inflicted. Id.
44. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
45. 440 Pa. at 552, 269 A.2d at 876.
46. Id. at 553, 269 A.2d at 877.
47. Id. at 554, 269 A.2d at 878. The cost of such improvements was
estimated to be $44,000. Id., 269 A.2d at 877.
48. Id. at 554-55, 269 A.2d at 877.
49. Id. at 554, 269 A.2d at 878.
50. Id. See, e.g., MacLean v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 82, 185
A.2d 533 (1962) (variance denied although a service station would be much
more profitable than the permitted residential use).
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variance,52 the court distinguished Gro in that the purchaser had full
knowledge of the unfavorable restriction when the land was acquired. 5
The supreme court continued its analysis by stating that when the
purchaser "acquired the property he did so with the conditions of
economic hardship staring [him] in the face, and [lie] cannot now be
heard to complain. In order for a hardship to be unnecessary, it can-
not be self-inflicted." 54 In the instant case it was the purchaser, by
paying an inflated purchase price for the property,55 who made it
economically impossible to construct homes on his property in accord-
ance with the zoning ordinance.50
52. See, e.g., Ferry v. Kownacki, 396 Pa. 283, 152 A.2d 456 (1959) (variance
to construct gas station granted where residential construction would be priced
out of area market due to terrain); Appeal of Garbev, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d
682 (1956) (economically infeasible to develop tract as residential considering
heavy traffic, railroad freight yard, and elevated trolley).
53. 440 Pa. at 556, 269 A.2d at 879. The Garbev and Ferry courts did
not deal with the McClure issue of the purchaser's knowledge of the zoning
restrictions, because it was not alleged that either of the landowners in those
cases had purchased the land with the view toward obtaining a variance.
For a discussion of the McClure knowledge rationale, see notes 34-40 and
accompanying text supra.
54. 440 Pa. at 557, 269 A.2d at 879.
55. Id. The court stated that the property was only worth the $40,000
purchase price if the anticipated variance were granted. Id. at 556, 269
A.2d at 879. There was no evidence presented as to the value of the property
with the zoning restriction imposed. Id. at 559, 269 A.2d at 880. Nor was
it elicited what the price range would be for homes constructed at that site.
Id. However, the court assumed that, given the evidence of the bleak environ-
ment and the $18,000 price range of other homes in the area, the $40,000
figure was highly inflated, due to the "gamble that he could obtain a variance
which would make his purchase profitable." Id. at 557, 269 A.2d at 879.
56. Id. at 557, 269 A.2d at 879. The court stated:
Only in a case such as this, which arises after the property has been
sold to a new owner who has paid a high price for the property be-
cause he assumed that a variance which he anticipated would justify
his price, do we hold that the owner cannot prove that the hardship
which burdens his land was unnecessary rather than self-inflicted.
Id. at 560, 269 A.2d at 880-81.
The Gro court analogized the situation it faced to the earlier Edwards
Zoning Case, 392 Pa. 188, 140 A.2d 110 (1958). In Edwards, the court opined:
When property is purchased pursuant to a plan of development
for uses by an existing zoning ordinance, and the plan miscarries, the
Furchaser is not entitled to a variance to permit his land to be used
r other unauthorized purposes, even though he will otherwise suffer
financial loss, if the property can reasonably be used for purposes
permitted by the ordinance.
Appellee bought the property with the full knowledge of the
terms of the ordinance. At the time he made his purchase, at a highly
inflated price, he should have investigated whether he could recoup
his investment in the event that his plans to erect an office building
for the hospital physicians did not materialize. Instead, Edwards
chose to gamble that the hospital would agree to use the proposed
building and that the commissioners would rezone the area to permit
[VOL. 27: p. 15G
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Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the hardship
was not self-inflicted, but was due to inherent topographical problems
of the land.5 7 Assuming the land cost the developer nothing, Justice
Roberts, using the majority's cost formula,5 8 determined that residential
construction on the property would cost twice as much as the going
price in the neighborhood.5 9 The dissent concluded, therefore, that
any use in accordance with the zoning regulation would be economically
impossible.60
C. No Productive Use for the Land
In Poster Advertising Go. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,6 ' one
Dopkis owned a small vacant piece of land, which at one time had been
substantially larger, but because of condemnation had been whittled
away.62 Poster Advertising subsequently leased the remaining land
for the erection of outdoor advertising signs, but was denied a variance
from the zoning ordinance. 6 ' The supreme court initially stated in
its analysis that ordinarily economic hardship is not sufficient in itself
to warrant the granting of a variance. 64 The court, however, went on
to say that Poster was not a case in which the owner seeks to use the
land in a more profitable manner, but rather, is a case where any
productive use of the land will be denied altogether.65 The court found
therefore, that there existed a substantial hardship peculiar to this par-
ticular piece of property.66  The court rejected the argument that no
the construction thereof. It now appears that his gamble has been
lost, and Edwards seeks to avoid the adverse financial consequences.
However, neither his present loss nor his prospective financial advan-
tage are sufficient justification for authorizing a departure from the
Lower Merion Zoning Ordinance.
One who acquires property intending to circumvent the use re-
strictions of a zoning ordinance does so at his financial peril.
Id. at 194-95, 140 A.2d at 113 (footnote omitted).
57. 440 Pa. at 556, 269 A.2d at 878 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 562, 269 A.2d at 881 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See text accom-
panying note 48 supra.
59. 440 Pa. at 562, 269 A.2d at 88 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
60. Id. Justice Roberts stated: "The developer did not bring this hard-
ship upon himself. Single-family dwellings cannot profitably be erected on this
property regardless of the price paid for the land . . . [A]ccordingly the
land is subject to a unique and unnecessary hardship." Id.
61. 408 Pa. at 248, 182 A.2d at 521.
62. Id. at 249, 182 A.2d at 522-23.
63. Id. at 250, 182 A.2d at 523. In denying the variance, the Board con-
cluded that: 1) the land was able to be used residentially; 2) the owner
was sufficiently compensated by the government for the loss of his land in the
condemnation proceedings; 3) the erection of the signs would be contrary to
the public interest and "constitute 'a commercial inroad in a predominately
residential district' "; and 4) such use would adversely affect the public health,
safety and welfare. Id. at 250-51, 182 A.2d at 523.
64. Id., 182 A.2d at 524.
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variance should be granted because the lessee leased the property with
complete knowledge of the zoning regulations,r stating that the lessee
stands in the same position as the owner, and the owner could not be
charged with buying into a situation where any productive use of the
land was denied.68
The approach taken by the Poster court was similar to that sub-
sequently taken in O'Neill.6o The O'Neill court, in discussing economic
hardship, distinguished cases where the property could not be used
profitably for any purpose under the applicable zoning ordinance, from
those situations in which the issue was which type of development
would be more profitable. 70 The O'Neill court stated:
The effect of the zoning ordinance and the development of the
area is to destroy the value of these people's land altogether,
or at least to the distress level where buying sharks can always
be found: that is not real value. It is not a case . . . where
there was basic value but the siren voice of progress made a
variance seem a luscious thing to have.
71
D. The Supreme Court's Most Recent Treatment of
Self-Inflicted Hardship
Although Upper Leacock Township Supervisors v. Zoning Hearing
Board 72 does not express any new principles with respect to the self-
inflicted hardship rule, it deserves separate discussion because it is a
recent opinion,73 in which the supreme court failed to take advantage
67. For a discussion of knowledge precluding the granting of a variance, see
notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
68. 408 Pa. at 252, 182 A.2d at 524.
69. 434 Pa. at 336, 254 A.2d at 15. For a discussion of O'Neill, see notes
17-18 & 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
70. 434 Pa. at 336, 254 A.2d at 15. The former situation is an example
of the Poster case, where if the variance was not granted to permit the erec-
tion of the advertising signs, the land would likely remain unused. See 408
Pa. at 251, 182 A.2d at 524. The Poster court noted: "If this use is denied, the
owner will be compelled to continue to pay taxes thereon, maintain the ac-
tual surface and adjoining sidewalks in a clean and reasonably safe condition
in order to escape possible damage claims, without any return from the use
of the property whatsoever." Id. The latter situation mentioned in O'Neill
is a description of the Gro line of cases. For a discussion of the Gro decision
and its progeny, see notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra.
71. 434 Pa. at 336, 254 A.2d at 15-16, citing Ferry v. Kownacki, 396 Pa.
283, 152 A.2d 456 (1959). In Ferry, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
the granting of a variance to the owner of land who wanted to build a gas
station in an area zoned residentially. 396 Pa. at 287, 152 A.2d at 457. There
was evidence to prove that because of the topography and surrounding con-
ditions, the land had virtually no residential value, and hence constituted a
hardship'unique and peculiar to itself. Id. at 285, 152 A.2d at 458.
72. 481 Pa. at 479, 393 A.2d at 5.
73. The date of this opinion, 1978, is of significance not only because it
is the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case dealing with this issue,
but it is the only supreme court case since 1970 to address the self-inflicted
hardship rule.
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of the opportunity to concisely restate the Pennsylvania self-inflicted
hardship rule.74 In Upper Leacock, appellant leased land for use as a
gift shop.76 After the lessee made extensive repairs to the premises, a
zoning ordinance was enacted which zoned the property residential, and
established a minimum lot width.76 Subsequent to the enactment of
the ordinance, the owner of the property agreed to sell that part of the
land being leased to the lessee.7 7 The lot offered was less than the
minimum lot width provisions of the zoning ordinance, causing the
lessee/purchaser to apply for a variance.7 8 The variance was subse-
quently granted by the zoning board, but was then, on appeal, set
aside by the court of common pleas.
7 9
The supreme court began its analysis by noting that the nature of
the lessee's expenditures were such that she would suffer serious finan-
cial loss if a variance were denied.80 Although the court recognized
that economic hardship alone is an insufficient basis on which to grant
a variance, it stated that the rule is applicable only where one type of
development will be more profitable than another.8 '
The court rejected the contention that the hardship was self-
inflicted, stating that the ordinance was not in effect when the property
was developed, and there was no indication that she knew, or had reason
to know, that her prospective purchase would be barred by any zoning
regulation8s Here the lessee did not cause her lot to be reduced below
that required by the ordinance, nor did she fail to apprise herself of
the zoning regulations in effect when she developed the property.83
Furthermore, the property was not developed in reliance on the ability
to get a variance.8 4 The court concluded that the hardship was due to
74. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text supra.
75. 481 Pa. at 481, 393 A.2d at 6.
76. Id. The effect of the ordinance was to make the gift shop a non-
conforming use. Id.
77. Id. at 482, 393 A.2d at 6.
78. Id.
79. Id. The commonwealth court subsequently affirmed the decision of
the lower court. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 363 A.2d 1330 (1976).
80. 481 Pa. at 483-84, 393 A.2d at 7.
81. Id. at 484, 393 A.2d at 7. The court relied upon the Gro decision
for this distinction, but held Gro inapplicable to the present situation. Id.
"Appellant desires to continue the use she has been making of the property
rather than to develop it in a new way." Id. For a discussion of Gro, see
notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra.
82. 481 Pa. at 484, 393 A.2d at 7.
83. Id., 393 A.2d at 8.
84. Id. The court therefore distinguished the present case from where
the alleged hardship was determined to be self-inflicted. Id. 393 A.2d at
8, citing Upper St. Clair Township Grange Zoning Case, 397 Pa. 67, 152
A.2d 768 (1959) (variance denied because zoning regulations known at time
of purchase); Richman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d
280 (1958) (variance denied because purchase was in reliance on ability to
1981-82]
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the unique characteristics of the property and the purchaser's inability
to increase the width of the lot, and therefore permitted the variance.85
E. Analysis of the Supreme Court Cases
It is contended that the approaches taken by the McClure,8 6 Gro s 7
and Poster 88 opinions, although focusing on different elements, can be
reconciled under a general analysis.8 9 The starting point from which
to analyze the consistency of the McClure, Gro, and Poster holdings
will be a discussion of the knowledge rule. The McClure line of cases
holds that a buyer purchasing property with knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existing zoning, will not be granted a variance be-
cause the hardship was self-inflicted.9 0
Upon comparing this line of cases to the holding of Gro, an incon-
sistency might develop because in Gro, the court appeared to focus on
the inflated purchase price paid by the buyer in the expectation of
obtaining a variance.9 1 In the course of its analysis, however, the Gro
court cited with approval earlier supreme court holdings which re-
ferred to buyers purchasing property with full knowledge of the terms
of the zoning ordinance.0 2 Because the Gro court could have based
its holding solely on the fact that the purchaser had knowledge of the
zoning ordinance at the time of the purchase (as it did in the three
other cases decided that same day),9 3 it is significant that the court
purposely went on to discuss the purchase price.9 4 It is suggested the
court intentionally did this in an effort to narrow the holdings of the
McClure line of cases which had made knowledge the determining
factor. As a result of Gro, the knowledge test has been incorporated
into the self-inflicted hardship rule because it cannot be said that one
acquire a variance); Volpe Appeal, 384 Pa. 574, 121 A.2d 97 (1956) (vari-
ance denied because landowner caused land to be reduced below the require-
ments of the ordinance). See also notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
85. 481 Pa. at 484, 393 A.2d at 8. The uniqueness of the property was
determined to be its narrowness. Id. "The size of the tract available to ap-
pellant may be a basis for relief. . . . This especially so in view of the fact
that she is unable to acquire more land." Id., 393 A.2d at 7 (citations
omitted).
86. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 91-106 and accompanying text infra.
90. For a discussion of the knowledge rule, see notes 34-43 and accom-
panying text supra.
91. See 440 Pa. at 556, 269 A.2d at 879.
92. Id. at 557-58, 269 A.2d at 879.
93. See note 43 supra.
94. See 440 Pa. at 556-58, 269 A.2d at 878-79.
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purchased the property at a premium in hope that a variance could be
obtained, unless the purchaser had knowledge of the zoning ordinance
as it applied to his property prior to the purchase.
Gro indicates that the supreme court desired to limit the knowl-
edge test to only those situations where the hardship alleged by the
purchaser was that of an economic hardship arising from the actual
purchase. 95 Indeed in McClure, the only hardship discussed was an
economic hardship, because the land could be used more profitably,
with respect to the purchase price, if the variance were granted.96
In the McClure progeny, however, it can be seen that the knowledge
rule was being applied to situations in which hardships existed that
were not arising solely out of the purchase price paid.9 7 Therefore,
the Gro court intended that the knowledge rule be limited to denying
a variance only when an inflated purchase price was paid in anticipation
of a variance, but not where unique topography prevented the land
from being used productively under the zoning ordinance.9 8
The analysis then must be to determine whether the Poster hold-
ing of economic sterilization 9 is consistent with the reconciled McClure
and Gro approaches.1 0° Although Poster involved a lessee, rather than a
purchaser, the lessee was permitted to stand in the shoes of the owner,
as long as the owner had done nothing to buy into the impossible
situation.10 1
Before Gro, it was perceived that the McClure knowledge test
could be used to preclude variances in all situations, regardless of the
hardship.' 02 In other words, the McClure line of cases contemplated
that in no situation where there was knowledge of the zoning ordinance
could a buyer stand in the shoes of the seller. The holding of Gro,
however, indicates that while the court was limiting the knowledge
rule, it was also expanding the number of situations in which the pur-
chaser could stand in his seller's shoes with respect to the claimed
hardship. As a result of Gro, the buyer, except when he has paid an
inflated purchase price, can now stand in the shoes of his seller with
respect to all other claimed hardships, except possibly those inten-
tionally created by the seller himself. This can now be done because
knowledge of the zoning regulations is only relevant when a high
95. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
96. See 415 Pa. at 287, 203 A.2d at 535.
97. See note 43 supra.
98. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
99. For a discussion of Poster, see notes 61-68 and accompanying text
supra.
100. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
101. 408 Pa. at 252, 182 A.2d at 524.
102. See the cases cited in note 43 supra.
1981-82]
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss1/4
VILLANOVA LAW REvIEw
purchase price is paid. 0' Therefore, once it can be determined that
indeed the supreme court will, in some situations, allow the buyer to
stand in the seller's shoes with respect to certain hardships, this de-
termination permits Gro to be reconciled with Poster.0 4
Therefore, upon analysis, it is suggested that these three supreme
court approaches may indeed be reconciled into a general two step rule.
The first step would be that the self-inflicted hardship rule will only
be invoked to deny a variance when the purchaser has paid an inflated
premium for the land.105 In the appropriate case, however, where other
hardships were argued in addition to the mere economic hardship,
the court will continue on to the second step. This step will involve
an analysis of these other hardships, such as topography and cost to
prepare the land for development, in order to determine if the land
can be productively used under the present zoning regulation. It is
only with respect to these other hardships that the purchaser will be
able to stand in the shoes of his seller. 0
The Upper Leacock case, decided in 1978, has significance because
it was the first self-inflicted hardship case decided by the supreme
court in eight years, and therefore presented the court with the op-
portunity to clearly state the law with respect to self-inflicted hardship
and eliminate any confusion as to whether there was one general rule
or three distinct approaches. 10' The supreme court's analysis in Upper
Leacock reiterated part of the Poster analysis by stating that economic
hardship may be considered in determining if a variance should be
granted where the issue is not whether a certain type of development
will be more profitable than another. 108
Beyond this analysis, however, the supreme court squandered an
opportunity to clearly state the rule with respect to self-inflicted hard-
103. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
104. A close reading of Gro indicates that the Poster situation was an-
ticipated in the earlier decision. In Gro, the court stated that there was no
evidence of the value of the land if the residential limitation was enforced.
440 Pa. at 559, 269 A.2d at 880. The court concluded that it was not possible
to determine if the requirement imposed an unnecessary hardship on the
property. Id. This language indicates that had evidence been introduced
on this point, the court may have undertaken an examination of whether
the owner's hardship was due to the inherent topographical problems of
the land, and not his knowledge per se.
The dissent in Gro explicitly acknowledged this possibility by assuming
the property had been acquired for free. 440 Pa. at 560, 269 A.2d at 880 (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts concluded that the land was incapable of
any use in compliance with the zoning regulation and that the hardship was,
therefore, not self-inflicted. Id. For a further discussion of the dissenting
opinion in Gro, see notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra.
107. For a discussion of Upper Leacock, see notes 72-85 and accompanying
text supra.
108. 481 Pa. at 484, 393 A.2d at 7.
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ship. This was an opportunity for the court to establish its position
with respect to knowledge of the zoning ordinance at the time of pur-
chase, and the effect of the purchase price paid. The court, however, did
not deal with the purchase price issue, and therefore expressed no opin-
ion as to the vitality of Gro with respect to the McClure knowledge
test.109 The approach taken by the supreme court was one in which
it distinguished other cases where self-inflicted hardship had been de-
termined."i 0 The court stated, and it is suggested erroneously, that
there was no indication that the purchaser knew or had reason to know
that her prospective purchase would be barred by any zoning
regulation."'
An analysis of the court's rationale in Upper Leacock leaves one
with the impression that the supreme court considered the Gro, Mc-
Clure, and Poster approaches as being distinct, and therefore, not one
concise rule.112 The Upper Leacock decision gives renewed vitality
to the strict McClure knowledge rule, while implicitly relegating Gro
to an inferior position, because the court, although presented with the
opportunity, failed to discuss the purchase price even though the trans-
action occurred a year after the zoning ordinance. 13 Therefore, if a
general rule on self-inflicted hardship were to be based on the Upper
Leacock decision, such a rule would not be the unified rule, as sug-
gested earlier, but rather a list of various approaches in which a par-
ticular case is to be categorized.
14
IV. PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH COURT DECISIONS
A. Case Law
As will be shown by the analysis of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court decisions, this court has often merely categorized the case before
it within one of the three supreme court approaches, and mechanically
applied that rule with no apparent regard to the other lines of cases.
For discussion purposes, the commonwealth court cases will be grouped
by the approaches on which their decisions relied.
1. The McClure Approach.
In 1972, the commonwealth court decided Drop v. Board of Ad-
justment. 1 5 In this case a landowner was granted a variance to con-
struct an apartment in an area zoned residential.116 The commonwealth
109. See id., 393 A.2d at 7-8.
110. 481 Pa. at 484, 393 A.2d at 7.
111. Id.
112. See notes 91-104 and accompanying text supra.
113. See 481 Pa. at 484, 393 A.2d at 7.
114. For an enumeration of the different approaches taken by the court,
see notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
115. 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 64, 293 A.2d 144 (1972).
116. Id. at 65-66, 293 A.2d at 145.
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court held that the record in Drop indicated that the land was pur-
chased with knowledge of the existing zoning regulations,117 and stated
that, "Drop's knowledge of the zoning restriction of the use of this
land when he purchased it effectively bars his assertion of his self-
imposed economic hardship as a basis for obtaining a variance." 118
Although Gro had been decided at this time, there was no reference to
the purchase price paid, nor was there any citation to the Gro
opinion." 9
The rationale of Drop was applied in 1976 to the case of Hager v.
Zoning Hearing Board. 20 In Hager, the appellant was denied a
variance to an off-street parking restriction which was in effect when
the property was purchased.' 21 The commonwealth court, in affirming
the denial of the variance, cited Drop,12 - and held, "[i]t is clear that a
variance to a zoning ordinance will not be granted if when the applicant
purchased the property lie knew or should have known of the restric-
tive zoning regulations applicable to the property." 123 Again, there
was no reference to the Gro holding with respect to the purchase price
paid for the property.
24
In 1976, it appeared as if the commonwealth court added a limiting
factor to the knowledge test in the case of Ephross v. Solebury Township
Zoning Hearing Board.1 5 In Ephross, the purchasers were experi-
enced developers familiar with subdivision plans and zoning regula-
tions. 126 The purchasers were denied a variance for certain lots which
117. Id. at 67, 293 A.2d at 145-46. The court pointed to landowner's testi-
mony that he bought the land intending to apply for a variance to support
this conclusion. Id. at 68, 292 A.2d at 146.
118. Id., citing McClure Appeal, 415 Pa. 285, 203 A.2d 534 (1964).
119. See 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 64, 293 A.2d 144. For a discussion of Gro,
see notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra. The failure to discuss Gro is
surprising in light of the strong factual resemblance of Drop to that case.
In both instances, the purchaser acquired the land with the stated intention
of not developing the property in accordance with the existing zoning regula-
tions. Compare 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 68, 293 A.2d at 146 with 440 Pa. at
557, 269 A.2d at 879.
120. 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 361, 352 A.2d 248 (1976).
121. Id. at 363, 352 A.2d at 250.
122. Id. at 366, 352 A.2d at 251. For a discussion of Drop, see notes 115-19
and accompanying text supra.
123. Id. The court noted that the zoning restriction was in effect when
the property was purchased. Id.
124. See id. at 361-67, 352 A.2d at 248-52.
125. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 140, 359 A.2d 182 (1976).
126. Id. at 142, 359 A.2d at 183.
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did not meet the size requirements of the ordinance. 12 7 The com-
monwealth court, in affirming the denial of the variance, 28 stated:
We also agree with the authorities below in their conclu-
sion that an experienced developer who purchases a large sub-
division with express knowledge of existing zoning regulations
and their applicability to that subdivision cannot be allowed
to frustrate an express provision of a zoning ordinance by de-
veloping a vacant irregular lot in violation of the law.
129
From a close reading of the language in Ephross, it appeared that the
court would limit the knowledge test to situations involving only
experienced developers."i 0 The two most recent commonwealth court
cases discussing the knowledge requisite, however, have not recognized
this language from Ephross."s
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court granted a variance to a
developer, despite knowledge of the zoning restriction, in McCarron v.
Zoning Hearing Board."2 In McCarron, the developer and the borough
mutually mistook the effect of vacating a street on frontage require-
ments, leaving the property in noncompliance with the ordinance.13
The court held that because of the mutual error, the developer's hard-
ship was not self-inflicted."
4
2. The Gro Approach
The first commonwealth court case to rely heavily on Gro 13 was
Pfile v. Zoning Board of Adjustment."86 The applicant, at the time he
127. Id. When the purchasers acquired the land, they were aware that
two of the parcels failed to meet existing zoning requirements. Id.
128. Id. at 145, 359 A.2d at 184. The court also noted that there was
no proof that the land had little or no value under the ordinance, evidencing
a lack of economic hardship. Id. at 144, 359 A.2d at 184.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
131. See Fotomat Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. 267,
414 A.2d 718 (1980); Sisko v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 36 Pa. Commw. Ct.
556, 389 A.2d 231 (1978). In Sisko, the court denied a variance to an individual
who had no expertise in building or developments, but had knowledge of
the regulation he sought relief from. 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 560, 389 A.2d
at 234. In Fotomat, the court charged the applicant with constructive knowl-
edge of the zoning laws at the time the property was leased, and therefore
denied the variance. 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 271 n.2, 414 A.2d at 720 n.2.
Although inferably Fotomat Corporation is an experienced developer of road-
side film centers, the court did not discuss this fact or the Ephross case. See
id., at 267-71, 414 A.2d at 718-20.
132. 53 Pa. Commw. Ct. 16, 416 A.2d at 1150 (1980).
133. Id. at 17, 416 A.2d at 1151. The developer had relied on the agreed
upon effect of vacating the street in laying out plans for the development. Id.
at 18-19, 416 A.2d at 1152.
134. Id. at 19, 416 A.2d at 1152.
135. For a discussion of Gro, see notes 44-56 and accompanying text
supra.
136. 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 226, 298 A.2d 598 (1972).
1981-82]
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss1/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
purchased the property, was undecided as to whether he would use the
property for residential or commercial purposes.1'37 Subsequently, an
agreement was entered into with an oil company conditioned on the
granting of a variance so that the property could be used commer-
cially.13 8  The Board, in denying the application for the variance,
relied on the fact that the purchaser had bought the property for in-
vestment purposes knowing the property was zoned residential. 3 9 The
commonwealth court, however, held that the variance should be
granted,140 and stated:
Only in a case such as [Gro], which arises after the property
has been sold to a new owner who has paid a high price for the
property because he assumed that a variance which he antici-
pated would justify his price, do we hold that the owner can-
not prove that the hardship which burdens his land was un-
necessary rather than self-inflicted.' 4 1
The Pfile court determined, therefore, that self-inflicted hardship could
only be found in those situations where a purchaser paid a high price
for the property in anticipation of a variance being granted to justify
the price.142 Here there was no evidence that a purchase under such
conditions was made, and therefore, there could be no self-inflicted
hardship.
43
The first commonwealth court case to take the position that Gro
was in fact a limitation on the McClure knowledge rule, was Harper v.
Ridley Township.44 In Harper, a consolidated appeal,145 all of the
owners sought variances to avoid the minimum dimensional require-
ments of the zoning ordinance. 46  The commonwealth court stated
137. Id. at 229, 298 A.2d at 600. The property was zoned for residential
use. Id. at 228, 298 A.2d at 600.
138. Id. at 229, 298 A.2d at 600. The lessee oil company desired to build
a gas station on the property. Id.
139. Id. at 236, 298 A.2d at 603.
140. Id. at 237, 298 A.2d at 604.
141. Id. at 236, 298 A.2d at 603 (citation omitted).
142. 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 236, 298 A.2d at 603.
143. Id. at 236, 298 A.2d at 604. The court noted that there was no
evidence indicating that the variance was necessary to justify the price, and
concluded the investment could have been for residential resale. Id. at 236,
298 A.2d at 603-04. See also text accompanying note 137 supra.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Blatt opined that McClure dictated a
denial of a variance because the purchaser knew of the regulation at the time
he acquired the property. 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 238, 298 A.2d at 606 (Blatt,
J., dissenting).
144. 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 93, 343 A.2d 381 (1975).
145. Id. at 95, 343 A.2d at 382. Three different owners sought a variance
from the same regulation. Id. at 96-97, 343 A.2d at 382-83.
146. Id. at 96, 343 A.2d at 383. The Board, citing McClure, denied one
variance on the basis of the owner's knowledge of the ordinance. Id. at 97-
98, 343 A.2d at 384.
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that the supreme court in Gro narrowed the circumstances in which a
landowner who purchases with knowledge of the property's condition
and the existing zoning classification will be prevented from obtaining
a variance. 47 The Harper court stated that under Gro, a landowner's
hardship is self-inflicted only where he has paid a high price for the
property because an anticipated variance would justify the price.
148
The mere fact that the property was purchased with knowledge of the
hardship, standing alone, would not preclude the granting of a
variance.
49
The Harper analysis of Gro's impact on McClure has been relied
upon by the commonwealth court several times since it was first enunci-
ated.150 These cases, however, have been interspersed with opinions
applying the knowledge test in its strict form.' 5'
3. The Poster Approach
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in McClure and Gro,
several Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decisions rely on Poster 152
without acknowledging the other strands of the self-inflicted hardship
rule. 153 The first such case was Jacquelin v. Horsham Township.
54
In Jacquelin appellants purchased property which the seller had owned
since before the zoning ordinance was enacted. 155 The lot was such
that if the purchaser desired to construct a dwelling on the property,
variances from the setback criteria would have to be obtained. 56 The
commonwealth court granted the variance, and relied on the Poster
language which indicated that if the land could not be productively
employed under the zoning ordinance, relief would be proper.157 Al-
though the case was decided after McClure and Gro, there was no
mention of either the purchase price paid, or the personal knowledge
147. Id. at 98, 343 A.2d at 384.
148. Id.
149. Id. For a discussion of the Gro case as a limitation on the McClure
knowledge rule, see notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
150. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 52 Pa. Commw. Ct. 224,
415 A.2d 946 (1980); Franklin Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 632, 391 A.2d 63 (1978); Scott v. Fox, 36 Pa. Comniw.
Ct. 88, 387 A.2d 965 (1978) (adopting lower court opinion which relied on
Harper). See also Scott v. Fox, 63 Del. County 401 (1976).
151. See notes 115-34 and accompanying text supra.
152. For a discussion of Poster, see notes 61-68 and accompanying text
supra.
153. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
154. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 473, 312 A.2d 124 (1973).
155. Id. at 475, 312 A.2d at 125.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 476, 812 A.2d at 125-26. See also note 65 and accompanying
text supra. The court noted that without a variance, the owners would be
forced to pay taxes on property that was vacant. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 475,
312 A.2d at 126.
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of the purchaser with respect to the zoning ordinance at the time of the
sale.15 s
The Jacquelin rationale was the basis of the commonwealth court
decision in Schaaf v. Zoning Hearing Board.15 In Schaaf, the pur-
chaser was denied a variance from the front and side yard requirements
of the zoning ordinance. 160 On appeal, the commonwealth court re-
jected the argument that Schaaf had created his own hardship because
he purchased the property when he knew, or should have known, of
the zoning classification of the lot.'6 ' The court stated that this case
was controlled by Jacquelin, and the resulting hardship was a conse-
quence of the zoning ordinance, and not the purchase itself. 6 2 The
court concluded that a variance was needed, or the property would be
useless in the hands of the purchaser.16 3
In 1979, the commonwealth court expanded on its Schaaf analysis
in Appeal of Grace Building Co.16 4 In Grace Building, the owner
acquired the property through a tax sale, and subsequently was denied
a variance in order to build a single family dwelling on the property. 6 5
On appeal, the commonwealth court remanded to the Board, and
offered certain points for consideration. 66 The court stated that a
subsequent purchaser can succeed to the position held by the pre-zoning
owner. 167 The court further stated that, as was noted in Schaaf, acquisi-
tion subsequent to zoning does not constitute a self-imposed hardship
because the hardship was not created by the purchase itself.0 8 Thus,
the commonwealth court concluded that:
Certainly, the mere fact that property changes hands after the
adoption of zoning cannot be a basis for holding that no vari-
ance can thereafter be granted with respect to any matter of
which the purchaser could be aware. Because zoning con-
siderations relate primarily to the circumstances of the property
and not to the identity of the owners, it would seem that sub-
sequent purchasers can stand in the shoes of the original owner
with respect to a variance, provided that the claimed hardship
does not arise out of the purchase itself, as was the case in
McClure Appeal ... where the alleged hardship arose out of the
158. See 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 473-76, 312 A.2d at 124-26.
159. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 50, 347 A.2d 740 (1975).
160. Id. at 52, 347 A.2d at 741.
161. Id. at 56, 347 A.2d at 743.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 39 Pa. Commw. Ct. 552, 395 A.2d 1049 (1979).
165. Id. at 554, 395 A.2d at 1050.
166. Id. at 557, 395 A.2d at 1051.
167. Id., citing Jacquelin v. Horsham Township, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 473,
312 A.2d 124 (1974).
168. 39 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 558, 395 A.2d at 1052.
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purchase price paid or . . . whre the physical size and shape
of the land was affected by the purchase transaction itself.16 9
B. Analysis of the Commonwealth Court Cases
The commonwealth court decisions have not recognized the unified
rule that was suggested earlier.170 Rather, like the supreme court, the
commonwealth court has generally categorized a given factual situa-
tion as falling within one type of rubric, and failed to consider an
overall analysis for self-inflicted hardship cases.' 7'
Accepting the suggested premise that the McClure knowledge rule
only applies to situations where an inflated purchase price was paid
in anticipation of a variance, 172 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
has continued in many instances to strictly apply McClure.173 But
other cases have recognized the Gro decision and its limitation on the
knowledge rule.
174
The line of commonwealth court cases discussing Poster 175 at-
tempt to develop a rule similar to that suggested in this comment
reconciling McClure, Gro, and Poster."6  It is this line of cases which
may be the most faithful to supreme court guidelines. This approach
is most clearly expressed by the Schaaf 177 and Grace Building 178 cases.
In Grace Building, the court addressed the issue of knowledge, and
stated that a subsequent purchaser can stand in the shoes of the original
owner with respect to a variance, unless the claimed hardship arose out
of the purchase itself.179 That part of the Grace analysis is an attempt
to reconcile the Gro and McClure cases, and to limit the knowledge
169. Id. See also, Haverford v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 55 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 209, 423 A.2d 757 (1980) (purchase of land with knowledge of zoning prob-
lem does not preclude variance unless acquisition itself gave birth to hard-
ship); Steen Indus. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 48 Pa. Commw. Ct. 469, 410 A.2d
386 (1980) (Poster dictates that land put in unusable position by eminent domain
deserves variance, irrespective of fact that land was purchased by one with
knowledge of problem).
170. For a discussion of the reconciliation of the McClure, Gro and Poster
decisions, see notes 88-106 and accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 115-69 and accompanying text supra.
172. For a discussion of McClure, see notes 34-40 and accompanying text
supra. For the suggested analysis of McClure read in conjunction with Gro,
see notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 115-34 and accompanying text supra.
174. For a discussion of the commonwealth court cases adhering to Gro, see
notes 135-51 and accompanying text supra.
175. For a discussion of the commonwealth court cases following Poster's
analysis, see notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 105-06 and accompanying text supra.
177. For a discussion of Schaaf, see notes 159-63 and accompanying text
supro.
178. For a discussion of Grace Building, see notes 164-69 and accompany-
ing text supra.
179. 39 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 558, 395 A.2d at 1052.
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rule to only those situations in which the hardship arises out of the
purchase. This is also indicated by the Schaaf opinion, where the court
rejected the knowledge argument in the face of other factors which
prevented any productive use of the property under the zoning ordi-
nance.' 80 Furthermore, the Schaaf court concluded that where other
factors exist rendering the property nonproductive under the ordinance,
and where these factors do not result from the purchase but are a
consequence of the land itself, the hardship is not self-inflicted.' 8'
Despite the line of commonwealth court cases faithful to Poster,
the court has interspersed these decisions with others adhering to Mc-
Clure or Gro.18 2 It can only be concluded, therefore, that the com-
monwealth court is unsure as to the direction of the supreme court,
especially in light of Upper Leacock, 8 3 and is only categorizing a case
in a manner that presupposes the holding. 84 It is suggested that the
commonwealth court decisions are more a function of categorization of
a case under one rule or another, than a sound analysis of the prin-
ciples involved.
V. ANALYSIS
Although not readily discernible, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
can be said to have fashioned a two step rule to be applied in self-
inflicted hardship cases.'a 5 The rule looks first at whether an inflated
price was paid for the property in anticipation of a variance. If the
price was inflated because of such an expectation, a variance will be
denied unless other topographical factors inherent in the land indicate
a lack of any use consistent with the zoning laws.' 88
In analyzing .this two step test, the first consideration is whether
such a rule is consistent with the underlying policy that the variance
provisions are intended to effectuate. As discussed earlier, the under-
lying purposes of the variance provisions are to: 1) act as a "safety
valve" to prevent constitutional attacks on the zoning ordinance that
allege undue interference with private property; 2) economically allow
certain property to be put to practical use where under the strict terms
180. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 56, 347 A.2d at 743.
181; Id.
182. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 115-51 and accompanying
text supra.
183. For a discussion of Upper Leacock, see notes 72-85 and accompanying
text supra.
184. For example, the cases applying the McClure rule have all found
that the applicant had knowledge of the restriction, and therefore suffered
from a self-inflicted hardship. See notes 115-34 and accompanying text supra.
On the other hand, cases following Gro and Poster tend to rule in favor of
the applicant. See notes 135-69 and accompanying text supra.
185. For a discussion of this rule, see notes 91-106 and accompanying text
supra.
186. See notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
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of the zoning ordinance no practical use was available; 3) prevent spot
zoning and help preserve the uniformity and effectiveness of the
zoning ordinance; and 4) allow variances to be granted sparingly only
in exceptional situations and when consistent with the public health,
safety, and welfare.
187
An analysis of the supreme court decisions in light of the policies
underlying the variance procedure adds weight to the premise that
McClure, Gro and Poster establish one rule to be applied in self-inflicted
hardship cases.' 88 Under the McClure approach, the knowledge test is
strictly applied, and therefore satisfies the policy that a variance should
be granted sparingly. A strict application of the knowledge test,- how-
ever, is such a demanding standard that it does not satisfy the "safety
valve" policy. Treating Gro as only a limit on the McClure analysis,
such that a variance will not be granted only in the situation where
an inflated purchase price was paid, shifts the pendulum too far to the
other side. In this situation, the supreme court would define so nar-
rowly the situations in which a variance cannot be granted, i.e. when
a high purchase price is paid, that, although the "safety valve" policy
is satisfied, variances are no longer limited to exceptional circumstances. 18
Therefore, by applying the two step analysis, a more complete
rule is created which tends to better effectuate the underlying policy.
The first step limits the strict application of the knowledge test, and
promotes the safety valve policy. The second step of the analysis,
based on the Poster decision, goes further than just consideration of
economic hardship arising from the purchase price. 90 If other hard-
ship factors are offered into evidence, the court will determine if the
property can productively be used under the zoning ordinance. If so,
the hardships must be self-inflicted, and will not be the basis for a
variance. The effect of this second step is to balance the granting of
variances against the general public welfare. The application of the
second step includes the consideration of other factors which will tend
to limit the granting of variances thereby promoting the exceptional
circumstance policy. The ultimate result of the application of this
rule is to balance the competing policies underlying variance statutes
so that neither the "safety valve" nor exceptional circumstance policy
totally prevail.
The Pennsylvania rule, which deemphasizes the knowledge test in
the self-inflicted hardship analysis, is consistent with other jurisdictions
187. For a discussion of the policy underlying the variance statute, see
notes 8-24 and accompanying text supra.
188. For a discussion of McClure, Gro, and Poster, see notes 91-106 and
accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
190. For a discussion of the effect of Poster on a unified analysis, see notes
102-04 and accompanying text supra.
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such as New Jersey.1 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in rejecting
the idea that a purchaser with knowledge of the restriction may not
assert a claim of hardship, stated:
We wish to make it clear that if a prior owner would be
entitled to such relief, that right is not lost to the purchaser
simply because he bought with knowledge of the zoning regu-
lation involved. This situation is not within the realm of the
self-created hardship which will generally bar relief.192
New Jersey courts have subsequently interpreted this language to mean
that where an original owner would be entitled to a variance under a
specific set of circumstances, any successor in title may also be entitled
to such a variance, provided that no owner in the chain of title since
the adoption of the zoning restriction has done anything to create the
condition from which relief is sought.19 3 To deny a variance because of
the knowledge of the purchaser would be inconsistent with the purpose
of allowing land to be utilized which had no practical use under the
zoning law.
In applying the two step test, the variance applicant could stand
in the shoes of the original owner without the hardship being termed
self-inflicted, so long as no owner in the chain of title had done any-
thing to intentionally create the hardship for which relief is being
sought. 94 The analysis for determining if the hardship was self-inflicted
would focus primarily on the characteristics of the land and the pur-
chase itself, rather than on the knowledge of the buyer and the specific
purchase price paid. Such an analysis would be sensitive to any hard-
ships arising out of the purchase, and not just those arising from an
inflated purchase price.
Although this suggested approach is only a restatement of what is
suggested to be the true Pennsylvania rule, it will make some variances
more difficult to get, because now the courts will consider all hardships
arising out of the purchase itself as being self-inflicted. 195  Such a
change, however, would better balance the conflicting policies underly-
ing the variance procedures. The biggest advantage to the adoption of
the suggested test, would be to establish a concisely stated rule, and
put to rest any belief that three distinct approaches govern the determi-
nation of whether a hardship is self-inflicted. 196
191. A. RATHKOPF, THF LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 39.02 at 39-15 &
16 (1979).
192. Wilson v. Borough of Mountainside, 42 N.J. 426, 452, 201 A.2d 540,
554 (1964).
193. See Griffin Construction Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 85 N.J. Super.
472, 473, 205 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1964).
194. For a discussion of the ability of a purchaser with knowledge of
the restriction to assert the seller's rights, see notes 102-04 and accompanying
text supra.
195. See notes 105-06 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented has shown that the various Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decisions concerning self-inflicted hardship can be
reconciled into one rule.1 97 The commonwealth court, in interpreting
and applying these supreme court decisions, has failed to undertake
this analysis. 98 To correct this situation, it is time for the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court to decide a self-inflicted hardship case, and enunci-
ate a clear, concise statement of the law. It is proposed that in stating
the Pennsylvania rule, the supreme court adopt the suggested refine-
ments to its earlier decisions. It is submitted that such a decision would
eliminate the confusion surrounding the Pennsylvania self-inflicted hard-
ship rule, and give the commonwealth court the necessary guidance
with which to properly decide variance cases.
Richard Gutekunst '
197. See notes 91-106 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 170-84 and accompanying text supra.
* Villanova Law School, Class of 1980; Staff Attorney Tennessee Valley
Authority; member, Pennsylvania Bar. This comment was written while Mr.
Gutekunst was a staff member on the Villanova Law Review.
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